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Abstract 
In this study we examine the impact of real estate brokerage firm characteristics on real estate 
prices from 2008 to 2013. We focus on single-family homes and condominiums from Duval 
County, the largest county in the Northeast Florida real estate market. Contrary to most research 
findings to date, we have strong evidence to suggest that homebuyers will fare better if they 
associate with small brokerage firms to represent their interest in the purchase transaction.  
Contrary to the previously published research, we found that firms associated with a national 
franchise garnered lower sales prices.    
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1. Introduction 
 
From 2008 until 2013, nearly 58,000 single-family homes and over 8,000 condominiums, 
totaling over $24.5 billion in sales volume, were transacted in Duval County, Northeast Florida 
with the assistance of a real estate agent. Nationwide, real estate brokerage is a large industry, 
which annually generates sixty to seventy billion dollars in revenue from home transactions. 
About seventy percent of Americans own the home they live in. Since a house often represents 
the largest portion of an individual’s wealth, understanding the home brokerage industry offers 
interesting strategic insight into the types of brokerage that will maximize the return from the 
real estate transaction. Understanding the residential real estate brokerage process and market 
takes on special significance in the context of the upheaval in the residential real estate markets 
that reached major proportions in late 2007. 
 
Since selling one’s home is likely to represent one of the largest lifetime transactions, and 
because most people purchase or sell residences only a few times in their lifetime, a market for 
specialized transaction assistance developed to assist home buyers and home sellers in finding a 
match, writing a contract, assisting with home inspections, financing, and ultimately closing the 
sale. The purchase or sale of real estate property is a complex process involving several 
sequential decision-making stages, in which most buyers and sellers seek out the professional 
services of real estate agents. The main stages in purchasing real estate from both the buyer’s and 
seller’s perspectives include: (1) the selection of ‘the right property’ for the buyer and making 
the initial offer, and, for the seller, accepting an offer from the potential buyers; (2) the home 
inspection; (3) getting financing approval; and (4) closing after the final walk-through 
inspection. In real estate terminology, only the last stage is commonly referred to as the 
“closing”, but because of the unique nature of the decision-making that takes place along the 
way, due diligence must be exercised at each stage. The deal can dematerialize at any of the four 
stages, as each of these decision stages is tactically complex and prone to mishap. Should the 
buyer or the seller walk out of any decision-making stage, a start-over is obviously required. 
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For a sales transaction to close successfully, a stable state needs to prevail at each decision-
making stage. Real estate sale associates, brokers, and other real estate professionals do 
recognize these stages as unique processes and dedicate time and energy to developing strategies 
to best assist buyers and sellers in successfully moving through the stages and eventually closing 
the real estate sale. A successful closing is important for buyers and sellers as well as for 
commission-paid brokerage firms and agents splitting the commission. 
 
According to the National Association of Realtors (NAR), 82% of residential real estate 
transactions are conducted with the assistance of real estate agents. The high frequency with 
which buyers and sellers choose to rely on brokers’ services suggests that brokerage services are 
valued (Beck, et al., 2013). The NAR reports that in 2004 there were over 236,000 active real 
estate brokerage offices operating in the United States. Offices in our dataset range in size from a 
single broker, with only one agent in the office, to very large firms with several offices and 
hundreds of agents serving the Jacksonville metropolitan area. 
 
In this study, we seek to extend the literature on the effect of brokerage firm size, national 
affiliation, and dual brokerage on the real prices of residential real estate. In our formulation we 
utilize a hedonic pricing model which has gained acceptance in the literature as shown in the 
comprehensive survey articles by Boyle and Kiel (2001) and Sirmans, Macpherson, and Zeitz 
(2005). This type of model has proven to be useful in identifying and exploring housing price 
determinants. 
 
Using MLS transactions from Greensboro, North Carolina, from 1991 to 1993, Jud and Winkler 
(1994) found that individual brokerage offices do not have a statistically significant influence on 
generating excess returns. Turnbull and Dombrow (2007) find that larger firms, both on the 
listing side as well as on the selling side, tend to be associated with higher sales prices. This 
could be related to the presence of a seller’s market (an “up” market) in those years. Similarly, 
Hughes (1995) finds evidence that larger brokerage firms are associated with higher sales prices. 
 
While earlier studies (Frew and Jud, 1986; Jud and Winkler, 1994) have found a non-negative 
association between franchise affiliation and firm earnings, a later study by Beck et al., (2013) 
found a negative association for the period 2006-2010 using data from Chatham County, 
Georgia. To explain the findings, Beck, et al. (2003) argue that franchise affiliation has 
historically offered a recognized brand and may have signaled greater quality service, especially 
to buyers who are new to an area or possess limited knowledge of local firms, but the advent of 
the digital age has diminished the competitive advantage of national affiliation. Nadal (2006) 
asserts that clients often conduct online research before contacting a brokerage firm. With MLS 
information becoming public, as opposed to being the exclusive domain of brokers and agents, 
residential real estate transaction information is available to anyone who has access to the 
internet. Beck, et al., (2013) argue that the leveling of exposure across firms could explain the 
reduced value of a franchise affiliation in later years.  
 
In Sections 2 and 3 of this study, the framework for the empirical analysis and a description of 
the data used in the estimations, including descriptive statistics, to test the potential effects of 
brokerage characteristics on real home sale prices in Duval County, Florida are provided. In 
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Section 4, the results of several specifications of the model are presented. In Section 5, a 
summary and overview of the findings is provided. 
 
2. Framework for Empirical Analysis 
 
Murdoch, Singh, and Thayer (1993), Sirmans, Macpherson and Zeitz (2005), Cebula (2009), 
Mihaescu and Von Hofe (2012), and many others provide a thorough overview of the underlying 
theory of the hedonic pricing model. These authors also provide numerous applications of the 
model in the context of real estate, thus the theoretical foundation receives little more than a 
summary treatment herein. The straight-forward premise is that a house characterizes a bundle of 
desirable and undesirable features for utility-maximizing consumers to evaluate. The evaluation 
of these features is capitalized into the transaction price of the house. The hedonic pricing model 
parses the transaction price into attributes such as interior and exterior features, locational 
factors, idiosyncratic characteristics associated with the house, and seasonal and timing 
(according to year) considerations. 
 
The model’s estimated parameters provide information about the significance and magnitude of 
the effect of any observable attribute of the house. 
 
The hedonic pricing model applied in this study takes the following general form: 
LNRSPj = f(Ij, Ej, Bj, Oj)         (1)  
 
where: 
LNRSPj = the natural log of the real price of house j, where the price of house j is expressed in 
2005 dollars; 
Ij = a vector of interior physical characteristics for house j; 
Ej = a vector of external physical characteristics for house j; 
Bj = a vector of characteristics associated with the brokerage process for house j; and 
Oj = a vector of other factors associated with house j. 
 
This model is estimated using a six-year period of data from January, 2008 through December, 
2013 from the Northeast Florida Association of Realtors (NEFAR) Multiple Listing System 
(MLS). The data is used to assess the relative importance of housing characteristics, brokerage 
characteristics, spatial effects, and time-related effects on real home sales prices in Duval County 
in Northeast Florida.  
 
Consistent with the literature where the hedonic model is applied to real housing prices, the 
interior physical characteristics of house j include the following: SQFTFIN, the total listed 
number of square feet of finished interior living space; BATHS, the listed number of full baths 
and half baths; and BEDS, the total number of listed bedrooms. As observed in Sirmans, et al. 
(2005) and Boyle and Kiel (2001), and based on a variety of other studies, including Coulson and 
Lahr (2005) and Cebula (2009), the real sales price of house j is expected to be an increasing 
function of the number of desirable internal and external physical housing characteristics. For 
example, the real sales price was expected to be an increasing function of square footage of 
finished living space and the number of bathrooms and bedrooms. 
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Among the exterior physical characteristics of house j in both single-family homes and 
condominium units, AGE, the age of each home in terms of the number of years since 
construction, was an exterior characteristic available in the dataset. Other studies have used the 
number of stories in the house structure, or the presence of brick or stucco on the exterior, the 
presence of an automatic sprinkler system, or the type of roof, as explanatory variables. These 
variables did not make much sense in the context of both condominium units and single-family 
houses. Indeed studies such Zietz, et al., (2008) and Zietz, et al., (2009) do not explore any other 
exterior characteristic variables besides AGE, in the presence of large datasets. 
Older homes may have a higher likelihood of needing repair and more imperfectly match modern 
preferences. As suggested in Sirman, et al., (2005), Clark and Herrin (1997), Decker, et al., 
(2005) and Laurice and Bhattacharya (2005), the age of a house is expected to adversely 
influence the market value of a house. In other words, the real sales price of the house is a 
decreasing function of AGE, ceteris paribus. 
A community feature constituting an additional exterior physical characteristic is GATED (=1 or 
0), whether the house is part of a gated community. Given that the presence of community 
features is related to additional costs homeowners have to pay (i.e., HOA fees), and arguably 
these features would be capitalized into the real price of house j. Because families derive a sense 
of prestige or security by a gated community, it is hypothesized that real housing prices are 
expected to be an increasing function of GATED.  
As any real estate professional will tell you, the three most important considerations when 
buying a home are location, location, and location. Accordingly, to control for spatial effects we 
have included binary variables for all the zip code areas, ZIP32202 thru ZIP32277 for which 
sales had occurred from 2008 to 2013. In addition, the NEFAR MLS system breaks down the 
Duval County using areas, AREA11 thru AREA232, for which we included binaries as an 
alternative to the zip codes. 
In addition, there are two other spatial control variables included in the models. It is 
hypothesized that houses that are located affront a river, lake, marsh, canal, creek, intracoastal 
waterway, or the ocean, WATERFRONT (=1 or 0) and those that are navigable to the ocean 
NAVOCEAN (=1 or 0) command a higher price due to their preferred prime location (Archer et 
al., 1996). 
Given that historic designation is associated with higher sales prices (Boyle and Kiel, 2001; 
Cebula, 2009; Clark & Herri, 1997; Coffin, 1989), it is hypothesized that a house with the  
designation as belonging to a national, or local historic district, should command a higher market 
price to reflect an element of prestige associated with such location. We expect HISTORIC (=1 
or 0) to be an increasing function of real house prices. 
Due to the ease and more secure nature of transactions represented by a cash purchase, it is 
hypothesized that CASH (=1 or 0) will negatively impact real house prices as sellers are willing 
to accept a lower cash offer, rather than a higher offer that is contingent on financing. This is 
especially true if sellers, banks, or the buyers want to close quickly.  
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Yearly control variables are present in the form of year fixed effects Y2008 thru Y2013. Given 
that this was a difficult time in the real estate industry, and that both average household income 
and employment rates significantly dropped after 2008, we expect that the Y2009 thru Y2013 
will have a negative effect on the real sales price. Likewise, seasonal controls by quarter, Q1, 
Q2, Q3 and Q4 are included to control for seasonal effects. Given the seasonal nature of single-
family house sales in general, we would expect that Q2 and Q3 would have a positive effect, 
while Q1 and Q4 would have a smaller positive effect than Q2 and Q3, or a negative effect. 
Lastly, we included DOM, the number of days the property was listed in the MLS system prior to 
the closing date. We hypothesize that this variable should have a negative effect on the real 
house prices, reflecting an undesirable property sitting in the market for too long, which leads to 
lower real sales prices, ceteris paribus. 
Since brokerage characteristics are the focus of this study, variables related to the brokerage of 
each observation are included. NATFRAN is a binary variable equaling one if the listing 
brokerage firm is affiliated with a national franchise, such as RE/MAX, Keller Williams or 
Century 21. The National Association of Realtors (NAR) 2013 reports have published a list of 32 
franchise brands, beginning operation in the US since 1971. We used this publication to create 
our binary variable NATFRAN equaling one for all listing brokerages in our dataset that were 
found on NAR’s publication, and zero otherwise. While earlier studies have found a non-
negative association between franchise affiliation and firm earnings (Frew and Jud, 1986; Jud 
and Winkler, 1994), a later study by Beck at al. (2013) found a negative association for the 
period 2006-2010. While we recognize that franchise affiliation can offer a recognized brand and 
may signal quality, (Frew and Jud, 1986; Jud and Winkler, 1994), especially to buyers new to an 
area or with limited knowledge of local firms, we believe that the brokerage process has evolved 
over the last two decades. With MLS information becoming readily available on the internet, we 
believe that the competitive advantage of associating with a national franchise has diminished. 
Accordingly and in agreement with Beck, et al., (2013), NATFRAN is expected to have a 
negative effect on the real sales price. 
 
DUALBROKER is a binary variable equaling one if the same firm handles the listing and selling 
brokerage. Jud (1994) finds that when the listing and selling firms in a transaction are the same, 
this leads to a slightly higher sales price. Turnbull and Dombrow (2007) and Beck, et al., (2013) 
find that houses listed and sold by the same firm sell for less. We expect DUALBROKER to 
negatively affect the real sales price. 
 
Variables capturing listing and selling firm size were also constructed. The variable LIST365 is 
the number of homes that were listed and sold by the same listing firm within the last 365 days. 
This variable serves as a measure of the size of the brokerage firm at the time of sale (Beck, et 
al., 2013). Similarly, the variable SELL365 was used as a measure of the selling brokerage firm 
size, as measured by other selling transactions by that broker within the last 365 days (Beck, et 
al., 2013). 
 
After consideration of an initial specification with LIST365 and SELL365, these variables were 
redefined as binary variables representing quintiles to allow for nonlinearity in their effects 
(Beck et al., 2013). The variable LIST0_19 is a binary variable equaling one if the associated 
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listing firm is in the bottom quintile of listing firms (between 0 and 19 listing transactions). 
LIST20_62 is a binary variable equaling one if the associated listing firm is in the second 
quintile (20 to 62 transactions). LIST63_147, LIST148_322 and LIST323_2466 correspond to 
the next three quintiles (63 to 147, 148 to 322 and 323 to 2466 listing transactions respectively). 
LIST323_2466 is the group’s reference category (the omitted category). 
 
Similarly, SELL0_16 is a binary variable equaling one when the associated selling firm is in the 
bottom quintile of selling firms (0 to 16 selling transactions), and this is the group’s reference 
category. SELL17_60, SELL61_155, SELL156_351 and SELL352_2927 correspond to the next 
four quintiles (17 to 60, 61 to 155, 156 to 351 and 352 to 2927 selling transactions, respectively). 
 
3. Data 
 
Our dataset for single-family homes and condominium units sold in Duval County over the six-
year period from January, 2008 through December, 2013 was obtained from the Northeast 
Florida Association of Realtors (NEFAR) Multiple Listing System (MLS). Duval county sales 
for the period under study were about half the sales of the entire NEFAR MLS five county area. 
Duval County contains four cities, Jacksonville, Atlantic Beach, Jacksonville Beach, and 
Neptune Beach. 
Data for 69,259 single-family houses and condominium unit sales, for which there was sufficient 
information for analysis during this time frame in Duval County, were converted to and 
expressed in 2005 dollars using the price index for single-family homes from the U.S. Census 
Bureau, to permit comparison of sales prices across the study period.  
 
Although we collected data for the period 2007-2013, all observations for year 2007 were 
dropped due to calculations regarding firm size, which required the number of previous sales for 
the last 365 days in each year. This reduced the total number of observations to 58,603. Our 
results in this study were drawn from the final data set of 58,603 observations. 
 
The data is used to assess the relative importance of housing characteristics, brokerage 
characteristics, spatial effects, and time-related effects on real home sales prices in Duval County 
in Northeast Florida. Table 1.1 provides summary statistics for all variables used in the 
specifications. 
 
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
We checked for high correlation coefficients among regression variables and the coefficients in 
Table 1.2 below were the highest present in our dataset. 
 
Table 1.2: Partial Correlation Matrix 
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4. Empirical Results 
In this section, a total of five model specifications are discussed: two for the baseline model, and 
three specifications for the main model. 
 
Baseline Model Specifications 
For the baseline model we used two specifications, differing only in the way spatial controls 
were introduced. In the first baseline specification, the spatial variables were zip codes 32202 
thru 32277, as shown in the summary statistics Table 1.1, and the omitted zip code binary was 
ZIP32202. In the second specification we omitted the zip code variables and substituted variables 
AREA11 thru AREA232 as shown in the summary statistics Table 1.1, and the omitted area 
binary was AREA 66 in the second specification. 
 
The differences between the baseline specification results were minimal. The specification with 
the AREA variables yielded a slightly higher R-squared and Adjusted R-squared; R-squared and 
Adjusted R-squared were each roughly 79% for the AREA specification and 77% for the ZIP. 
Each specification yielded consistent and reasonable coefficients, and F-statistics were well 
within the acceptable range. Semi-log specifications were employed with LNRSP (=log (RSP)) 
as the dependent variable. In each of the estimates, the White (1980) procedure was adopted to 
correct for heteroskedasticity. 
 
In the interest of the efficient use of journal space, the full results of the baseline specifications 
are not presented; these results are available are available upon request (and partially shown in 
the appendix). Also, in the main model specifications that follow, as in the baseline 
specifications, the AREA variables were included for control purposes. We only provide 
specifications where AREA11 thru AREA232 spatial controls were present. Specifications with 
ZIP 32204 thru ZIP 32277 yielded very similar results, and were not included, but are available 
upon request. Also, in the main model specifications that follow, the coefficients for the AREA 
variables were suppressed. While recognizing that location is a very important determinant of the 
pricing in any real estate transaction, in this study, the intent is to focus on the impact of 
brokerage firms and identify the most salient variables.    
 
Main Model Specifications 
For the main model, two specifications are estimated initially; subsequently, a third specification 
is estimated. Specification 1 differs from Specification 2 only in the way the firm size control 
variables were operationalized. In the first specification, the firm size variables LISTSALES365 
and SELLSALES365, which measure previous transactions by the brokerage firms (on the 
listing and selling side respectively) within the last year, were used. In the second specification, 
to allow for the non-linear effect of firm size, these variables were parsed into categorical binary 
variables, each representing a quintile. In both, a semi-log specification was employed with 
LNRSP as the dependent variable. In each of the estimates, the White (1980) procedure was 
adopted to correct for heteroskedasticity. The results for each of the binary variables were 
interpreted according to the procedure developed in Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980). 
 
 
Table 2. Main Model Specifications 
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In the main model specifications, the Y2009 binary was the omitted year binary, and the fourth 
quarter (Oct-Dec), Q4 was the omitted quarter. In main model specification 2, LIST323_2466 
was the omitted quintile for the listing firm quintiles, and SELL352_2927 was the omitted 
quintile for the selling firm quintiles. 
Most pertinent to this study are brokerage effects. In Table 2, association with a national 
brokerage house (i.e., when NATFRAN=1), such as REMAX or Keller Williams is associated 
with a 1.9% to 2.2% decrease in sales price of the home, and significant at the 1% level in each 
specification. One possible explanation for this could involve the evolution of the brokerage 
process over the last few decades. Another possibility is that access to internet-based 
transactional information has reduced the value of intermediaries like national franchise 
brokerage companies.  According to Beck, et al., (2013) the leveling of exposure across firms 
could explain the reduced value of a franchise affiliation in later years. Our result is in line with 
expectations and consistent with Beck, et al., (2013). 
 
Homes that are listed and sold within the same brokerage house (i.e., when DUALBROKER=1) 
were associated with around a 4.2% lower sales price and significant at the 1% level or better. 
Rutherford (2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2005) suggest that agents and brokers have an 
informational advantage over their clients. They argue that potential home buyers who have 
reached out to a specific brokerage firm and do not have time deadlines, constitute a group of 
potential buyers that are more readily available than the pool of potential buyers at large (Beck et 
al., 2013). Our results suggest that brokerage firms may use their informational advantage to 
persuade their clients to accept internal offers. This obvious moral hazard situation causes home 
sellers to accept a significantly (4.2%) lower price, allowing the broker to sell “in house” and 
collect both sides of the commission (Beck, et al., 2013). Clearly, it is important that home 
sellers be vigilant about in-house selling to guard against lower returns, whereas homebuyers 
would be the beneficiaries of the lower prices and benefit from in-house sales.    
 
Results with regard to firm size effects in Specification 1 suggest that the marginal effect of 
additional homes sold by the brokerage firm, LIST365, was associated with slightly lower sales 
price. This result was statistically significant at the 1% level. The interpretation of this result 
suggests that evaluated at the mean sales price, listing one’s home with a firm that sells five 
houses more per month than an alternative firm will on average be associated with an 
approximately $1,000 lower relative selling price. This result is inconsistent with previous 
findings including Beck, et al. (2013) and a contribution of this study. This result could be due to 
differences in real estate markets in the two metropolitan areas, although Savannah, Georgia and 
Jacksonville, Florida would seem to be similar. It also may be influenced by the “down market” 
during the course of our dataset. Beck, et al., (2013) have both “up market” and “down market” 
years in their dataset which may explain the difference result. 
 
Size of the selling firm, SELL365 has no statistically significant effect in this specification, 
which is consistent with Beck, et al., (2013) findings. 
 
In the second specification, with the firm size variables decomposed into binary categorical 
variables, an empirically richer picture emerges. Comparing the variables LIST0_19, 
LIST20_62, LIST63_147, and LIST148_322 to the fifth quintile group, LIST323_2466, which 
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was omitted as the reference group, the results suggest that there is a small advantage (to the 
seller) in hiring relatively smaller to firms. As can be seen in specification 2, the relative return 
of the smallest quintile at 6%, is slightly larger than the relative return of the second quintile at 
5.5%, which is slightly larger than the relative return of the third quintile at 5.2%. So the relative 
return tops out at 6% for the small firms in the first quintile, and the return gets smaller for each 
successively larger quintile.   
 
A very different picture emerges when looking at the results from the selling side. In comparison 
to the very largest firms, the very small and small firms appear to be associated with a lower 
sales price, which is hugely advantageous to the buyers. The negative coefficients on Sell0_19 
and SELL20_62 variables (significant at the 95% level), suggest that in comparison to the fifth 
quintile the buyers are experiencing a relative reduction in price, in the range of 1.2% to 1.3%.   
Those buyers associated with medium and large firms appear to experience about 1.2% to 2% 
higher prices compared to the very largest firms, which, of course is relatively disadvantageous 
to the buyers, but consistent with the Beck, et al., (2013) findings.  
 
Summarizing, from the buyer’s perspective, working with smaller brokerage houses appears to 
be associated with the most desirable outcome. Relative to the very largest firms, the very 
smallest (first quintile) and smallest (second quintile) firms are associated with statistically 
significant lower prices of 1.3% and 1.2%, respectively. The next best brokerage houses for the 
byers appear to be the very largest firms. 
 
 
4.1 Empirical Findings for the Top Five Largest Listing Firms 
 
The NAR reports that in 2004 there were over 236,000 active real estate brokerage offices 
operating in the United States. Offices in our dataset range in size from a single broker, who may 
be the only agent in the office, to very large firms with several offices and hundreds of agents 
serving the Jacksonville metropolitan area. Our dataset contains 1,162 unique listing 
firms/offices and 901 unique selling firms/offices. The large disparity in firm size can be 
attributed to the presence of the Multiple Listing Service system, and the relatively low barriers 
to entry, granting all participants equal listing exposure regardless of size. As a result one may 
expect this market to be highly competitive. Via such a platform, smaller firms can advertise 
listings on equal grounds with larger ones, while obtaining exposure to a local, national and 
international audience.  
 
The Department of Justice, however, has reported evidence of high market concentrations in 
some areas. In response to the DOJ’s concerns, a 2005 study of the NAR offers evidence to 
suggest that real estate markets are competitive in every dimension, including price. 
On the other hand, the rigid six percent commission structure raises additional questions about 
the competitiveness of the real estate industry. While collusion over commission rates is illegal, 
brokerage firm owners can and do impose floors on commissions their agents can charge.  
 
Since each city/town is an individual and autonomous market, national measures of 
concentration are of little value in analyzing individual markets such as the real estate market in 
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Duval County comprising the cities of Jacksonville, Neptune Beach, Atlantic Beach, and 
Jacksonville Beach. 
 
The largest listing brokerage firms in our dataset were Watson Realty Corp. with 25 offices, 
Berkshire Hathaway Homeservices Florida Network Realty with 8 offices (formerly Prudential 
Network Realty), Coldwell Banker with 16 offices, RE/MAX with 17 offices and Keller 
Williams with 7 offices. 
 
In Table 3 we turn our attention to the largest listing firms in the fifth quintile. To investigate 
whether there are advantages to being among the largest firms, and to explicitly account for the 
effects on the real sales price that the largest real estate brokerage firms had in our dataset, we 
added an additional estimate, Specification 3. Specification 3 is identical to Specification 2 with 
the exception that variables were added for each of the top 5 firms. For instance, consider the 
WATSON variable; when the sale was made by the Watson firm the binary variable would be 1, 
0 otherwise. 
 
Table 3. Top Five Largest Firms Specifications 
 
In Table 3, the results suggest that listing with Watson Realty Corp (WATSON) or Keller 
Williams (KELLWILLIAMS) contributes to about 11.6% higher prices. Listing with Berkshire 
Hathaway Homeservices Florida Network Realty (formerly Prudential Network Realty) 
contributes to higher prices of 8.4%, while listing with Coldwell Banker contributes to 2.4% 
higher prices, and listing with RE/MAX (REMAX) contributes to 4.8% higher prices. Our 
conclusion is that there are advantages to listing with the largest brokerage firms as they seem to 
be able to garner higher prices and may have some market power in the Northeast Florida 
market. This result is not surprising. It is reasonable to suspect that the firms garnering relatively 
more of the market share in any area are doing so because they are providing a relatively better 
service. This may be due to advantages, such as more experienced sales associates or perhaps a 
better marketing plan.  
 
Lastly, the results in Specification 3 are sufficiently similar to the results of Specifications 1 and 
2 that we feel they corroborate and support the conclusions stated earlier in the paper. 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
In this study, a hedonic pricing model is applied to single-family houses and condominiums sold 
in Duval County, Florida in the six-year period from January 2008 through December 2013. The 
3 major specifications include internal and external housing attributes, general spatial controls, 
and controls for brokerage characteristics, such as brokerage firm size, national franchise 
affiliation, and the presence of dual brokerage. 
 
Many of the results of this study are consistent with, and in line with what has been published 
previously. In particular we find that dual brokerage results in relatively lower sales prices. This 
finding is consistent with the expectations found in the present specification, and it results in a 
lower return to the seller and the advantage going to the buyer. It is also found in this study that, 
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contrary to nearly all of the existing published literature on the topic, that firms associated with a 
national franchise garnered lower sales prices. This outcome also was in line with the 
expectations expressed in this study, as the availability of brokerage transaction information on 
the internet has leveled the playing field, giving small brokerage houses the tools to compete 
with the national franchise organizations. 
 
Contrary to nearly all of the published related research findings to date, a significant contribution 
to the literature is provided in this study, namely, there is current evidence suggesting that home 
buyers will fare better and garner lower purchase prices if they associate with small brokerage 
firms. Presumably, this phenomenon is also due to the widespread information availability, 
which has allowed small firms to compete with large firms especially on the buying side. Also 
found in this study is weak evidence suggesting that sellers may be better off associating with 
smaller firms, unless they can associate with the top-selling firms in the area. These results imply 
that sellers are better off to list with small firms or the top selling firms in the area, while buyers 
are better off working with small firms.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LNRSP 11.615 0.857 9.17 15.52 
SQFTFIN 1759.850 710.292 348 12000 
BEDROOMS 3.145 0.811 1 9 
BATHS 2.018 0.653 0 22 
AGE 28.483 28.673 0 1813 
GATED 0.134 0.340 0 1 
AREA11 0.014 0.118 0 1 
AREA12 0.025 0.157 0 1 
AREA13 0.040 0.196 0 1 
AREA14 0.060 0.238 0 1 
AREA15 0.029 0.167 0 1 
AREA21 0.016 0.124 0 1 
AREA22 0.038 0.190 0 1 
AREA23 0.051 0.221 0 1 
AREA24 0.048 0.214 0 1 
AREA25 0.025 0.155 0 1 
AREA26 0.044 0.204 0 1 
AREA27 0.012 0.107 0 1 
AREA31 0.008 0.087 0 1 
AREA32 0.017 0.130 0 1 
AREA33 0.009 0.092 0 1 
AREA41 0.061 0.240 0 1 
AREA42 0.038 0.190 0 1 
AREA43 0.030 0.171 0 1 
AREA51 0.015 0.120 0 1 
AREA52 0.010 0.099 0 1 
AREA53 0.012 0.109 0 1 
AREA54 0.010 0.098 0 1 
AREA55 0.004 0.066 0 1 
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AREA56 0.024 0.152 0 1 
AREA61 0.017 0.130 0 1 
AREA62 0.020 0.139 0 1 
AREA63 0.023 0.150 0 1 
AREA64 0.011 0.104 0 1 
AREA65 0.004 0.066 0 1 
AREA66 0.002 0.047 0 1 
AREA67 0.032 0.175 0 1 
AREA71 0.013 0.112 0 1 
AREA72 0.010 0.100 0 1 
AREA73 0.003 0.057 0 1 
AREA74 0.015 0.122 0 1 
AREA75 0.035 0.184 0 1 
AREA81 0.015 0.123 0 1 
AREA82 0.001 0.038 0 1 
AREA91 0.036 0.187 0 1 
AREA92 0.028 0.164 0 1 
AREA95 0.004 0.066 0 1 
AREA96 0.020 0.141 0 1 
AREA211 0.005 0.074 0 1 
AREA212 0.010 0.101 0 1 
AREA213 0.008 0.090 0 1 
AREA214 0.018 0.134 0 1 
AREA221 0.002 0.043 0 1 
AREA222 0.005 0.073 0 1 
AREA231 0.015 0.122 0 1 
AREA232 0.007 0.084 0 1 
ZIP32202 0.003 0.054 0 1 
ZIP32204 0.007 0.081 0 1 
ZIP32205 0.038 0.191 0 1 
ZIP32206 0.013 0.114 0 1 
ZIP32207 0.036 0.186 0 1 
ZIP32208 0.029 0.168 0 1 
ZIP32209 0.016 0.125 0 1 
ZIP32210 0.063 0.244 0 1 
ZIP32211 0.030 0.172 0 1 
ZIP32216 0.040 0.195 0 1 
ZIP32217 0.021 0.143 0 1 
ZIP32218 0.061 0.240 0 1 
ZIP32219 0.011 0.106 0 1 
ZIP32220 0.009 0.095 0 1 
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ZIP32221 0.028 0.164 0 1 
ZIP32222 0.013 0.114 0 1 
ZIP32223 0.030 0.169 0 1 
ZIP32224 0.055 0.228 0 1 
ZIP32225 0.069 0.253 0 1 
ZIP32226 0.025 0.155 0 1 
ZIP32233 0.022 0.148 0 1 
ZIP32234 0.003 0.053 0 1 
ZIP32244 0.067 0.250 0 1 
ZIP32246 0.060 0.237 0 1 
ZIP32250 0.046 0.210 0 1 
ZIP32254 0.012 0.109 0 1 
ZIP32256 0.058 0.233 0 1 
ZIP32257 0.041 0.197 0 1 
ZIP32258 0.058 0.234 0 1 
ZIP32266 0.007 0.085 0 1 
ZIP32277 0.030 0.170 0 1 
WATERFRONT 0.092 0.289 0 1 
NACOCEAN 0.024 0.153 0 1 
HISTORIC 0.028 0.165 0 1 
CASH 0.371 0.483 0 1 
DOM 0.130 0.336 0 1 
Y2009 0.146 0.354 0 1 
Y2010 0.162 0.369 0 1 
Y2011 0.165 0.371 0 1 
Y2012 0.179 0.383 0 1 
Y2013 0.217 0.412 0 1 
Q1 0.213 0.409 0 1 
Q2 0.277 0.447 0 1 
Q3 0.259 0.438 0 1 
Q4 0.251 0.434 0 1 
DOM 102.022 123.757 0 2077 
NATFRAN 0.257 0.437 0 1 
DUALBROKER 0.196 0.397 0 1 
LIST365 196.885 264.925 0 2517 
SELL365 214.053 297.649 0 2927 
LIST0_19 0.201 0.401 0 1 
LIST20_62 0.197 0.398 0 1 
LIST63_147 0.202 0.401 0 1 
LIST148_322 0.200 0.400 0 1 
LIST323_2466 0.200 0.400 0 1 
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SELL0_16 0.200 0.400 0 1 
SELL17_60 0.199 0.399 0 1 
SELL61_155 0.200 0.400 0 1 
SELL156_351 0.201 0.401 0 1 
SELL352_2927 0.199 0.400 0 1 
WATSON 0.162 0.369 0 1 
BERKSHIRE 0.053 0.225 0 1 
COLDWELL 0.059 0.235 0 1 
REMAX 0.077 0.267 0 1 
KELLWILLIAMS 0.039 0.194 0 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2: Partial Correlation Matrix 
  BATHS BEDROOMS WATERFRONT NAVOCEAN 
BATHS 1       
BEDROOMS 0.5619 1     
WATERFRONT 0.1802 0.0486 1   
NAVOCEAN 0.1352 0.0108 0.4938 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Main Model Specifications 
Table 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 
LNRSP Coefficient T-Value Coefficient T-Value 
Constant 10.569 337.12 10.512 334.2 
SQFTFIN 0.0005 125.77 0.0005 125.63 
BEDROOMS 0.064 21.9 0.064 21.97 
BATHS 0.052 13.97 0.052 14.06 
AGE -0.003 -45.3 -0.003 -45.22 
GATED 0.047 8.78 0.048 8.96 
AREA11 0.694 21.24 0.692 21.18 
…         
AREA232 0.246 7.02 0.246 7.03 
WATERFRONT 0.158 24.94 0.157 24.92 
NAVOCEAN 0.384 32.12 0.385 32.22 
HISTORIC 0.395 28.57 0.395 28.63 
CASH -0.446 -125.55 -0.447 -125.61 
Y2008 0.192 32.6 0.192 32.56 
Y2010 -0.096 -17.21 -0.095 -17.15 
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Y2011 -0.186 -33.19 -0.185 -33.1 
Y2012 -0.161 -28.93 -0.161 -29.0 
Y2013 -0.049 -8.99 -0.049 -9.01 
Q1 0.006 1.28 0.005 1.13 
Q2 0.023 5.49 0.023 5.43 
Q3 0.017 3.96 0.017 3.9 
DOM -0.00003 -2.33 -0.00003 -2.32 
NATFRAN -0.018 -5.03 -0.021 -5.84 
DUALBROKERAGE -0.043 -10.67 -0.042 -10.56 
LIST365 -0.0001 -13.55     
SELL365 0.00001 1.0     
LIST0_19     0.061 11.78 
LIST20_62     0.054 10.57 
LIST63_147     0.051 10.09 
LIST148_322     0.039 7.87 
SELL0_16     -0.013 -2.6 
SELL17_60     -0.012 -2.42 
SELL61_155     0.020 4.12 
SELL156_351     0.012 2.43 
N 58,603   58,603   
F-statistics F(71, 58531) = 3549.46 F(77, 58525) = 3275.98 
Prob > F 0   0   
R-squared 0.8115   0.8117   
Adj R-squared 0.8113   0.8114   
 
 
 
Table 3. Top Five Largest Firms Specifications 
  Specification 3   
LNRSP Coefficient T-Value 
Constant 10.505 336.24 
SQFTFIN 0.0005 125.89 
BEDROOMS 0.064 21.95 
BATHS 0.053 14.19 
AGE -0.003 -46.84 
GATED 0.046 8.65 
AREA11 0.667 20.55 
…     
AREA231 0.956 29.74 
WATERFRONT 0.149 23.65 
NAVOCEAN 0.382 32.21 
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HISTORIC 0.384 27.99 
CASH -0.437 -123.33 
Y2008 0.191 32.68 
Y2010 -0.097 -17.58 
Y2011 -0.193 -34.68 
Y2012 -0.174 -31.44 
Y2013 -0.066 -11.98 
Q1 0.009 2.08 
Q2 0.024 5.73 
Q3 0.017 3.99 
DOM -0.0001 -4.56 
NATFRAN -0.021 -3.54 
DUALBROKER -0.045 -11.19 
LIST0_19 0.096 18.13 
LIST20_62 0.077 14.84 
LIST63_147 0.061 12.1 
LIST148_322 0.039 7.87 
SELL0_16 -0.008 -1.58 
SELL17_60 -0.008 -1.63 
SELL61_155 0.022 4.4 
SELL156_351 0.011 2.29 
WATSON 0.116 25.2 
BERKSHIRE 0.084 11.7 
COLDWELL 0.025 3.05 
REMAX 0.048 6.2 
KELLWILLIAMS 0.116 12.19 
N  58,603    
F-statistics F(82, 58520) = 3128.29 
Prob > F 0.000   
R-squared 0.814   
Adj R-squared 0.814   
 
 
 
 
 
